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Since fighting began in 2014, significant areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions in eastern Ukraine have been contaminated by landmines and unexploded ord-nance (UXO). This article will briefly cover the origin of 
the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM) and its 
mandate, before turning to the types of contamination observed 
by the SMM in eastern Ukraine. On 21 March 2014, the 57 partici-
pating States of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in 
Europe (OSCE) made a consensus decision to deploy the SMM, and 
the SMM’s mandate has been extended each year since. The SMM es-
tablishes facts and reports on the security situation across Ukraine, 
monitors and supports respect for human rights and fundamental 
freedoms, and facilitates dialogue.  
The SMM has around 600 unarmed civilian monitors in eastern 
Ukraine who patrol accessible areas in the Donetsk and Luhansk 
regions. The presence of explosive remnants of war (ERW) forms a 
major impediment to the SMM’s freedom of movement across these 
regions, a fact tragically highlighted by a fatal incident on 23 April 
2017 near Pryshyb, after which the SMM’s patrols have been limited 
to asphalt and concrete surfaces only.1 
In terms of mine action, in signing the Minsk memorandum in 
September 2014, the sides have already agreed to remove all mines 
and not to install or lay mines in the security zone.2 There is an 
urgent need to clear contaminated residential areas, and items of 
ERW pose a serious danger to civilians crossing the area between 
the forward positions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and those of 
the armed formations.3
UKRAINE
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An unexploded PG-7L grenade lies by the side of the road in the 
area separating the armed parties. The bottles were placed there 
by locals to alert drivers to the presence of the UXO as emer-
gency services are not able to operate in the zone, 7 March 2017. 
Photo courtesy of OSCE/Edward Crowther.
ICRC-installed sign warning of amphibious mines in the Azov Sea, Donetsk region.  
Image courtesy of OSCE/Edward Crowther.
1
Crowther: Contamination in Eastern Ukraine
Published by JMU Scholarly Commons, 2019
ISSUE 23.1 @ APRIL 2019 25
Lack of Information
One of the key problems from a mine action perspective is the 
lack of comprehensive non-technical surveys (NTS) in the Donetsk 
and Luhansk regions, owing—among other factors—to a lack of ac-
cess to large areas of the contact line as the conflict remains active.4,5 
Many important NTS have been done, in particular in government-
controlled areas, but the international and government organizations 
that undertake surveys are mostly unable to work in the contact line 
area for obvious reasons, and no known form of NTS has been under-
taken in the non-government-controlled areas. 
This lack of information is a key impediment to the SMM, as it 
undertakes its work in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions and direct-
ly affects the safety of SMM patrol teams. For this reason, as well as 
overall monitoring of commitment to the Minsk memorandum, the 
SMM—while not a mine action organization—takes a keen interest 
in the presence of ERW, reporting on these in its daily reports. This 
information comes not just from SMM patrol teams on the ground—
which have unique access to many areas on both sides of the contact 
line—but also via the use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV), which 
help the SMM to overcome some of the freedom of movement restric-
tions imposed by the presence of ERW. 
Anti-tank and Anti-vehicle mines (ATM/AVM).6 By far, AVMs 
comprise the most prevalent type of mine contamination observed 
in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions. The most common AVM type is 
the TM-62M, with the plastic-bodied TM-62P3 also being observed 
in fewer numbers. An unusual feature of the mine contamination 
observed by the OSCE SMM, compared to comparable minefields in 
other contemporary conflicts, is the prevalence of surface-laid AVM 
minefields. These range from small minefields across tarmac roads 
that comprise only a few mines to surface-laid minefields across large 
open fields. An SMM UAV recently identified a surface-laid linear 
minefield, most probably laid by a mechanical minelayer, which was 
2.7 km (1.7 mi) in length and contained an estimated 900 AVM.7 
The TM-83 off-route AVM has also been observed in small num-
bers in the Donetsk region, seen for the first time by the SMM in 
2019.8 Additionally, parts of the coast in the Donetsk region are 
known to be contaminated by PDM-1M amphibious mines. SMM 
monitors observed some of this mine laying taking place, and the 
same event was widely reported in open source media.9 
Anti-personnel mines (APM). Prior to the start of hostilities, the 
government of Ukraine had declared that no APM were emplaced 
on Ukrainian territory. With the subsequent emplacement of such 
mines, Ukraine in 2018 requested an extension of its deadline un-
der the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) to remove 
them. The Meeting of States Parties to the APMBC granted the ex-
tension, until 1 June 2021, at its 17th meeting in November 2018.10 
The SMM has observed a number of APM types across the Donetsk 
and Luhansk regions. 
The OZM-72 bounding APM have been observed across the con-
flict area, and has been reported on by the SMM on numerous oc-
casions.11 Other AP mine types observed include the MON-series 
directional APM and the POM-2 APM.12 The SMM has also observed 
TM-62P3 mine, Donetsk region. 
Image courtesy of OSCE/Edward Crowther.
TM-83 off-route mine, Donetsk region. 
Image courtesy of OSCE/Jacek Hajdukiewicz.
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other evidence of APM use, such as the presence of the plastic 
cruciform-shaped tripwire launchers from POM-2 APMs scattered 
across tarmac roads in close proximity to the Donetsk water filtration 
station. OSCE monitors have been present during the demolition of 
PMN-2 APMs by the Ukrainian Armed Forces.13,14 
Unexploded ordnance (UXO). The SMM has observed and re-
ported on thousands of items of UXO on both sides of the line of 
contact. These range from small-arms ammunition all the way up to 
unexploded 300 mm Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) rock-
ets. An exhaustive list of all types of explosive hazards is beyond the 
scope of this article.
Explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) teams conduct spot tasks on 
both sides of the contact line, and the SMM has enjoyed some success 
in reporting items of UXO to the respective sides and advocating for 
their removal.15 However, an area of difficulty is the area between the 
forward positions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and those of the 
armed formations, where neither side is able or willing to risk their 
personnel in clearing items of ERW left behind by shooting.2,3 
On several occasions, the SMM has observed items of ERW ly-
ing at the entry-exit checkpoints between the two sides.2 These entry-
exit checkpoints are already dangerous places for civilians, who are 
exposed to long queues in areas that lack adequate shelter, water, or 
proper sanitary resources, and who sometimes come under fire. The 
presence of ERW in close proximity, sometimes only a few meters 
away from queueing pedestrians or vehicles, only adds to these risks. 
As an example, a PG-7L round was observed on 7 March 2017, ly-
ing on the H15 highway in the area between the forward positions of 
the Ukrainian Armed Forces and those of the armed formations.3,16 
This entry-exit checkpoint is one of the busiest and is used by thou-
sands of civilians a day. Owing to the lack of EOD capacity able to 
work in the area between the forward positions, the round remained 
on the highway for several days, indicated with informal marking, be-
fore disappearing, probably removed by a civilian. 
Another issue of particular note is the presence of high-explosive 
bullets across the conflict area. The 12.7 mm MDZ snap action incen-
diary round has a small, high-explosive charge. A number of civilian 
casualties have been attributed to this round, with some occurring to 
young children who have picked them up. Painted bright red, they are 
often mistaken for standard incendiary rounds, and people are usu-
ally unaware of the dangers associated with them. 
Conclusion
The lack of information on the mine contamination situation in 
the Donetsk and Luhansk regions of Ukraine remains one of the 
key dangers to civilians in eastern Ukraine, as well as being one of 
the main impediments to the SMM’s freedom of movement in the 
area. Forwarding information about facts on the ground, includ-
ing the risks posed to civilians by ERW, is one way that the SMM 
makes a contribution toward a safer, more secure environment for 
civilians. 
See endnotes page 69
POM-2 APM in close proximity to the Donetsk water filtration station, Donetsk region. 
Image courtesy of OSCE/Edward Crowther.
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